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World trade dropped 12% in the volume in 2009.1 Being closely integrated into
the global economy, China’s exports were badly hit during this recession. China’s
total export value dropped about 16% in 2009 relative to the one in 2008.2 Figure 1
presents China’s monthly exports values from January 2008 to November 2010.
It is clear that China’s exports keep decreasing by large amounts from September
2008andtouchthebottominFebruary2009. Thispaperstudiestheperformanceof
China’s exports during the 2008–2009 ﬁnancial crisis and investigate the speed at
which China’s exports fall below their pre-crisis comparable levels. In this paper,
we ﬁrst quantity the speed of exports collapse and then test the factors which may
affect this speed.
The following work has been done in this paper. First, we present some broad
facts of China’s exports during the 2008—2009 collapse. Second, we predict four
key variables’ impacts on collapse speed according to demand-side and supply-
sidemechanismsforthistradecollapse, respectively. Somekeyvariables’hypothe-
ses are different, which allows us to test which general mechanism is more appro-
priate to explain the large contraction in China’s exports. Third, in order to study
the contraction speed properly, three issues on estimation methods are worth dis-
cussing in detail. The ﬁrst one is how to deﬁne when the exports of an industry
to a particular country can be labeled as falling into collapse. The product-country
combinations are labeled as falling into collapse at the ﬁrst month from which their
exportsvaluesfallbelowthelevelsofthesamemonthsinthepreviousyear, atleast
for three months in a row. The export values being lower than their values of the
same month a year before only for one or two months does not necessarily indi-
cate the exports have fell into collapse. Here we use three successive months as the
main criteria with the two or four months for robustness tests. The second issue
on estimation methods is to make sure the time window within which we analyze
the collapse includes almost the whole process of the contraction from the begin-
1WTOPressRelease598, 26March2010. http://www.wto.org/english/news e/pres10 e/pr598 e.htm.
2It is based on author’s calculation.
1Figure 1: China’s Exports from January 2007 to November 2010
ning to the end. We count the number of country-product combinations whose
exports are labeled as falling into collapse. This number starts its upward trend in
September 2008, reaches the maximum in May 2009, and comes back to the level
maintained prior to the crisis since December 2009. It implies that China’s exports
are most broadly affected by the recession in the middle of 2009. Our time window
starts from January 2008 and ends in November 2010 the latest month with China’s
export data available, with May 2009 just in the middle. The third issue on estima-
tion methods is to use a proper econometric method to test the factors which may
explain the heterogeneity in collapse timing. We use survival analysis in empirical
study, which has been quite standard in analyzing the time to the occurrence of an
event.
The following results have been found in this paper. We ﬁnd that it takes longer
periods of time for exports to show the sign of collapse when the GDP growth
rates of importing countries are higher. This effect is especially strong in magni-
tude at the beginning of the recession. It is also found that capital and intermediate
goods collapse later than consumption goods. This ﬁnding is very intuitive since
2quite a lot intermediate and capital goods are the inputs for the production of ﬁnal
products. Compared with consumption goods, they are in the upper stages of the
production chain. Differentiated goods show signs of exports collapse earlier than
homogeneous ones. This result is related to the low elasticities of substitution asso-
ciated with differentiated goods relative to homogeneous ones. Last, the industries
with high shares of processing trade show the sign of export collapse much earlier
than the goods with low shares of processing trade although it has been found
that they contract by smaller amounts in value during recessions according to the
previous literature. This quick response can be attributed to the fact that process-
ing trade could essentially be regarded as foreign production procedures accom-
plished in China. When the demand in foreign countries drops in recession, the
production in foreign countries responds quickly; and then the demand for pro-
cessing trade drops correspondingly. The higher share of the processing trade an
industry has, the more closely the industry is integrated into foreign production.
This paper is related to the fast-growing literature on the trade collapse. Be-
cause the 2008–2009 trade collapse was “sudden, severe, and synchronised”,3 a
number of hypotheses have been proposed to explain the causes of this collapse
and why trade ﬂows were much more volatile than GDP. The main driving forces
could be summarized as the reasons from demand and supply sides. On the de-
mand side, Eaton, Kortum, Neiman, and Romalis (2011) use elaborate general
equilibrium model and suggest that the collapse in trade was primarily driven
by synchronized demand-side shocks. Baldwin (2009) includes a large survey of
the empirical studies of the trade collapse and concludes in favor of demand-sided
explanations. As mentioned by Ahn, Amiti, and Weinstein (2011), so far there has
been little doubt that demand plays a predominant part in the recent decline in
world trade. Meanwhile increasing attention has been put on a dramatic trade
credit crunch as another important explanation. Ahn et al. (2011), Amiti and We-
instein (2009), Chor and Manova (2010) and Feenstra, Li, and Yu (2011) provide
goodevidence insupportofthis mechanism.4 InHaddad, Harrison, andHausman
3It is cited from page vii in Baldwin (2009)
4On credit crunch driving the trade collapse, there are two different mechanisms. One mecha-
nism is that because international trade usually takes longer periods of time and incur more risks
3(2010), they show that both demand and supply-side reasons play a part in the re-
cent trade collapse. Other than these fundamental forces, Bems, Johnson, and Yi
(2011) and Yi (2009) show that the global supply chains speed up the transmission
of the trade collapse from the recession’s epicenter to other countries.5 Imported
intermediate inputs act as conduits. Anderton and Tewolde (2011) also provides
some evidence for this explanation. In addition, in explaining the high elasticity
of international trade to GDP, Alessandria, Kaboski, and Midrigan (2010) empha-
size that international trade meet the demand for both sales and inventories. Since
inventories are procyclical, international trade is much more volatile than sales.
This paper contributes to the literature in the following two main ways. First,
to our best knowledge, this study is the ﬁrst piece to study how soon exports col-
lapse and test the determinants of this speed. People care about the extent to which
exports are struck by the recession. Other than the magnitude of the trade contrac-
tion, it is also useful to know when the exports are severely affected. This infor-
mation will assist people in understanding the general process of recessions and
making better predictions on recession in the future.6 The products or regions
whose exports contract by large shares may not necessarily fall at the beginning
of the recession, and the exports that drop by small amounts may not decrease at
the end of the downturn. It is therefore necessary to check whether the factors
that are found having signiﬁcant effects on the size of the collapse also have “sim-
ilar” effects on the speed. This distinction could provide us with new empirical
than domestic trade, exporters tend to be more heavy users of trade ﬁnance than domestic ﬁrms.
The sudden ﬁnancial arrest hurts international trade, especially the sectors intensively depend on
trade ﬁnance and reduces the supply of exports. The other mechanism is related to the standard
payment procedure in international trade, i.e. letters of credit. Letters of credit essentially sub-
stitutes people’s trust in banks for the trust between ﬁrms. As banks were badly hit during this
recession, it damages the foundation of letters of credits and impedes their implementation, the
most standardized settlement instrument in international trade.
5Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2010) provide empirical evidence for this mechanism.
6Burns and Mitchell (1946) have done much work on this topic.
4evidence in deepening our understanding about the mechanisms in the 2008–2009
trade collapse. The continuous monthly country-product exports data set allows
us to fully enjoy the beneﬁts of survival analysis. The heterogeneity in the tim-
ing of the export collapse across different products and countries are carefully ex-
plored. Second, this paper focuses upon China’s export collapse during the recent
economic downturn. China is well known as a “world factory” and become in-
creasingly important worldwide. It is important to study how China’s exports
respond during the 2008—2009 world trade collapse. On this perspective, this
work is close to Levchenko et al. (2010), Behrens, Corcos, and Mion (2010), and
Bricongne, Fontagn, Gaulier, Taglioni, and Vicard (2009). Levchenko et al. (2010)
use 6-digits industry data on U.S. imports and exports to show the anatomy of
this collapse. Behrens et al. (2010) study Belgium’s data to test the determinants
of the size of the trade contraction. Firm-level imports and exports data with bal-
ance sheet information are fully explored in Behrens et al. (2010). Bricongne et al.
(2009) provide an examination of French ﬁrm-level exports. Besides the works fo-
cusing on the trade performance of a speciﬁc country, Haddad et al. (2010) analyse
the impacts of the 2008 collapse by using the data of Brazil, the European Union,
Indonesia, and the United States. Wang and Whalley (2010) focus on trade perfor-
mance of Asian countries in the 2008—2009 economic recession. Compared with
Wang and Whalley (2010), this paper focuses on China’s exports during the 2008—
2009 trade collapse. Feenstra et al. (2011) also studies the exports of Chinese ﬁrms
during the crisis, but they focus upon how ﬁnancial constraints faced by exporting
ﬁrms. This paper gives the predictions based on both sides explanations and lets
the estimation results justify which explanation is more appropriate to explain this
collapse in China’s exports.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 shows some broad
facts of China’s exports during the 2008—2009 collapse. Section 3 presents the
predictions. The empirical strategy is discussed in section 4. Sections 5 and 6
present and discuss the estimation results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Collapse of China’s Exports: Aggregate Impacts
We ﬁrst provide an aggregate snapshot of China’s export collapse. The stunning
decrease starts in September 2008, as it is shown in Figure 1. But this large drop
5Table 1: Total China Exports Comparison
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
2007 86 82 83 97 93 103 107 111 112 107 117 114
2008 109 87 108 118 120 120 136 134 135 127 114 110
2009 88 63 88 89 86 95 105 103 116 111 113 130
2010 83 91 109 117 128 133 145 139 145 136 153
Note:All numbers are in billion USD and rounded to whole numbers for demonstra-
tion purposes.
involves clear seasonal ﬂuctuations. Around 40% of China’s exports go to North
American and European markets. Since December and January are the holiday
seasons in those markets and spending is usually very high, it is not surprising to
observe that China’s exports reach the maximum in the middle of the year. Table
1 demonstrates China’s monthly export values in chronological order. It shows
that from January 2009, the monthly export values are about more than 16% lower
than the ones of the same periods in the previous year, and this status maintains
until November 2009. China starts to come out of this collapse in late 2009. From
February 2010, China’s exports come back to or even outgrow its levels prior to the
recession.
The Chinese monthly export data are collected from the Customs General Ad-
minstration of the People’s Republic of China. It starts from January 2007 and
ends in November 2010, including 35 months. The unit of observation is at the
HS6 product-country-month level. The HS 6-digit is in 2007 version.
Trade collapse is not uniform across products. China is no exception. In the fol-
lowing part of this section, ﬁner breakdown by product categories and geographic
markets are demonstrated.
Figure 2 presents the exports decomposed by different product categories. The
left panel of Figure 2 decomposes the products by the system of national account.
The total exports are classiﬁed as capital, intermediate, and consumption goods.
From this ﬁgure, we can see that export values of capital, intermediate and con-
sumption goods all drop substantially from late 2008 and touch the bottoms in
February 2009. They gradually get better afterwards but keep being lower than
the levels of the same periods in 2008. This kind situation remains until the end
of 2009. Focusing on the ﬁrst half year of 2008, the export values of capital and
intermediate goods are higher than the ones of the same months in the previous
6Figure 2: Product Breakdown
year; however, consumption goods’ exports are lower. In addition, consumption
goods’ exports are more volatile than the other two types. The right panel of Fig-
ure2decomposesthegoodsbytheconservativeclassiﬁcationintroducedbyRauch
(1999). Consistent with our expectation, differentiated goods take a majority share
in China’s total exports. Differentiated and intermediate goods exhibit quite sim-
ilar patterns over time. They both decline in late 2008 and touch the bottoms in
February 2009. The exports of homogenous goods are be more ﬂuctuated than the
other two categories.
We also decompose industries according to their shares of processing trade
in value. Two ﬁndings in the literature motivate this breakdown. Bems et al.
(2011) propose that global value chains transmit the crisis from the epicenter of
the crisis to other countries. The other ﬁnding is that trade between related par-
ties contracts much less than trade in arm’s-length relationships during the eco-
nomic crisis, which has been found in US trade by Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and
Schott (2009) and Schott (2009) in both the 1997 Asia ﬁnancial crisis and 2008–2009
world ﬁnancial crisis. Exports through processing trade account for a large share
in China’s total exports. In 2006, processing trade accounts for 52.1% of China’s
total exports in value. It comprises processing trade with imported inputs and
processing trade with supplied inputs. For both types of processing trade, inputs
are shipped to China ﬁrst. After being processed, the outputs are exported to for-
eign countries. The share of processing trade in a product’s total exports reveals
7Figure 3: China’s Exports Divided by the Share of Processing Trade
the extent to which the exports of the industry are integrated into global produc-
tion chains.
AllHS6-digitindustriesarerankedbytheirsharesofprocessingtrade. Because
our 2007—2010 data set does not include the information on the type of trade, we
obtain the shares of processing trade for each industry by using the custom trade
data in 2006, the latest year with the information available. Among all HS 6-digit
industries available in our monthly exports data, the median share of processing
trade is 0.136, and the mean is 0.247. Because this ratio is continuous, in order
to demonstrate a general pattern, each HS 6-digit product in 2007 version is cod-
iﬁed as either a high or low processing trade type. A product is classiﬁed as a
high type if its share of processing trade is strictly greater than the median, and
a low type otherwise. Figure 3 shows that processing trade is very important for
China’s exports. It drops by a large amount in the later half year of 2008. The
high type also exhibits larger variations than the low type. In both 2009 and 2010,
the exports of products with high shares of processing trade demonstrates a much
stronger upward momentum than the low type. The exports of high processing
trade industries clearly come out of the recession in May 2010.
Figure 4 exhibits the exports to different geographic markets. Four points are
8Figure 4: Geographic Areas Breakdown
worth mentioning. First, comparing the two panels, it is clear that Asia, Europe,
and North America are China’s major exporting destination markets. The exports
to Africa, Latin America and Oceania take only about 10% in China’s total exports.
Second, each trend exhibits a sharp downturn in late 2008, reaches the bottom in
February 2009, and comes out of recession in early 2010. Third, the exports to
Oceania and Africa become lower than their values of the same months in the
previous year until early 2009, later than the exports to Europe and North America
who start showing the sign of export collapse in late 2008. Last, the exports to
Asia, Latin America and Africa demonstrate strong momentums coming out of
the collapse in 2010. In contrast, the recovering tendencies shown in the exports to
North America and Europe are quite limited.
Our exercises have been very descriptive until this point. They have high-
lighted several important features of the data. Before turning to formal econo-
metric analyses, we need to explain the key variables studied in this paper and
their predictions on speed according to the mechanisms on demand and supply,
respectively.
3 Predictions
Four key variables are investigated in this paper. One is the GDP growth rates
of the countries who import from China. The other three variables are product
9characteristics. The predictions of these four variables are summarized in Table
2. In Table 2, column 1 gives the predictions if this collapse in China’s exports is
driven by foreign demand shocks; column 2 then list the hypotheses if this export
contraction is caused by supply-side issues.
Table 2: Prediction on speed
Demand Supply
GDP Growth Rates – ?
SNA (capital and intermediate) – +
Rauch (differentiated) + +
Processing trade + –
First, the exports to the countries with high GDP growth rates should fall into
collapse later if foreign demand shocks are the main driving force for this collapse
in China’s exports. Behrens et al. (2010) use Belgium ﬁrm data and ﬁnd that GDP
growth rates of importing countries has a signiﬁcant and positive effect on the size
of trade contraction during the 2008–2009 ﬁnancial crisis. This result is taken as
evidence for the demand-side explanation of this trade collapse. If this mechanism
also works in China, in terms of speeds, we expect China’s exports to the countries
with high GDP growth rates show the sign of the collapse later than the exports to
other countries. On the other hand, if this collapse is driven by supply-side shocks,
GDP growth rate of importing countries should have no effects on speed.
Second, capital and intermediate goods should fall into collapse later than con-
sumption goods if foreign demand shocks cause this export contraction. Behrens
et al. (2010) and Eaton et al. (2011) both ﬁnd that exports of capital and durable
goods contract by larger shares in the 2008–2009 recession. This result is also taken
as evidence for the demand shock explanation for this trade collapse. If the same
mechanism also works in China, with regard to speed, we expect that the exports
of capital and intermediates goods show the sign of the collapse later than the ex-
ports of consumption goods. The reason is that capital and intermediate goods
are in the upper stages of the production chains, and it takes sometime for the
downstream demand shocks to be transmitted upstream. Meanwhile, it is impor-
tant to realize that capital and intermediate goods require larger amount of capital
in exporting transaction. If it is the ﬁnancial constraints faced by Chinese export-
ing ﬁrms that lead to this collapse, capital and intermediate goods should fall into
10export collapse earlier than consumption goods.
Third, under both the demand-side and supply-side explanations for this col-
lapse in China’s exports, we expect that more differentiated goods show the sign
of collapse earlier than the homogeneous ones. Broda and Weinstein (2006) ﬁnd
that differentiated goods have lower elasticities of substitution than homogeneous
goods. Being integrated into the global production chains, it is relatively harder
for differentiated goods to ﬁnd new matches. If either demand or supply drops,
the exports of differentiated goods are expected to drop sooner than the exports of
homogeneous ones.
Last, industries with higher shares of processing trade should fall into collapse
earlierifthisexportcontractionisdrivenbyforeigndemandshocks; however, these
industries should collapse later if this contraction is caused by ﬁnancial constraints
faced by exporters. In essence, processing trade is foreign production procedures
implemented in China. When foreign demand drops in crisis, foreign production
responds rapidly followed by the decrease in demand for processing trade. The
higher share of processing trade an industry has, the more closely this industry is
integrated into foreign production. Compared with the industries with low shares
of processing trade, we expect that industries with high shares of processing trade
show the sign of collapse earlier. Meanwhile, it is worth emphasizing that com-
pared with ordinary trade (i.e. industries with low shares of processing trade),
processing trade are less constrained by exporters’ own ﬁnancial constraints. Then
if it is the ﬁnancial constraints faced by exporting ﬁrms that lead to this large ex-
port contraction in China, we should expect that industries with high shares of
processing trade show the sign of collapse later than other industries.
4 Estimation Methods
In this paper, we investigate the timing of different product-country combinations
when they fall into collapse. Because speed is different from sizes that most previ-
ous works focus upon, three issues on empirical strategy are discussed in the fol-
lowing: deﬁnition of collapse, time window, and econometric estimation method.
We deﬁne the exports of a product from China to a speciﬁc country fall into
collapse when its export value is below the level of the same month a year before at
leastforthreemonthsinarow. Forexample, iftheexportvaluesofJanuary, February
11Figure 5: Ratio of country-product combinations labeled in collapse (3 months)
and March in 2009 are all smaller than the values of the same periods in 2008, this
country-product combination is labeled as falling into collapse in January 2009, i.e.
the month when the status changes. If in March 2009 the export values are equal
to or greater than that in March 2008, neither January nor February in 2009 can
be taken as the period when the combination falls into collapse. In other words,
the condition of having lower export values for at least three successive months is
applied in deﬁning the period when a product-country combination is labeled as
falling into collapse. This requirement is necessary because having relatively lower
exports value just for one month cannot be taken as the evidence that exports have
fell into collapse. However, this three-month criteria is quite arbitrary. In order to
test our results are not driven by this speciﬁc deﬁnition, we also use 2 months or 4
months as the criteria in robustness tests.7
In order to justify our time window is reasonable, we need to make sure that
our time window includes the period when China’s exports are most affected. Ide-
ally, this period should be in the middle of the range. Figure 5 shows the fraction
of country-product combinations labeled as falling into collapse in each month. In
the whole sample, there are 450438 country-product combinations whose export
values are positive in at least one month from January 2008 to November 2011.
These combinations involve 223 countries and 4897 HS 6-digit codes 2007 version.
7The estimation results are very similar to the ones with 3 months as the criteria.
12Each point in the ﬁgure represents the share of the 450438 country-product com-
binations which are labeled as falling into collapse. It is clear that before August
2008, the ratio stays less than 5%. From September 2008, this number increases
rapidly. In May 2009, it reaches the maximum: 8.82% of the combinations have fell
into collapse. Our time window for the following study is from January 2008 to
November 2010. May 2009 is just in the middle of this range. Therefore, our time
window seems to be reasonable.
It is important to use a proper econometric method to estimate the time to
the occurrence of an event. A simple OLS or log-linear model is not appropri-
ate mainly because of the following two reasons. Most importantly, OLS assumes
normality of the error term which is rarely satisﬁed for time. Suppose if we think
about an event with instantaneous risk of occurring is constant over time. Then
the distribution of time would follow an exponential distribution. Although linear
regression is known to be remarkably robust to deviations from normality. The
problem is that the distribution for time to an event might not even be symmetric,
they might be bimodal. Then the linear regression is not robust to these violations
(Cleves, Gould, Gutierrez, and Marchenko, 2010, Page 2). Another reason people
often emphasize is that survival analysis deals with right-censoring properly. Be-
cause for any study with time constraints, by the end of the observation period,
the failure event might have not yet occurred for some subjects. Survival analysis
deals with this situation properly.
Survival analysis is applied to analyze the collapse speed of exports. It directly
models the hazard rate of an event. The higher the hazard rates, the higher the risk
of the occurrence of the event. The hazard rate is written as
h(t) = lim
t!0






where T refers to the duration of a country-product dyad having not fell into col-
lapse. The numerator f(t) is the probability density function, and S(t) is the sur-
vival function. The hazard rate is the instantaneous rate of failure. In this case, the
failure refers to the instantaneous rate of falling into collapse. Survival analysis
directly models the hazard rate.
As a popular semi-parametric estimation method for duration analysis, we use
the proportional hazards model (Cox, 1972). The speciﬁcation could then be put
13forward as below.
lnh(t) = lnh0(t) + Wc + Zp (1)
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard function. Letters Wc and Zp denote the country
and product characteristics, respectively;  and  are their vectors of parameters
correspondingly. As discussed in previous section, each importing country’s ag-
gregated demand is captured by the GDP growth rates. Products characteristics
are captured by two sets of classiﬁcations (SNA and Rauch) and the share of pro-
cessing trade measured in the 2006 data.
5 Estimations Results
Column 1 of Table 3 shows the estimation results from speciﬁcation (1). Over-
all, it provides good evidence for the demand-side explanation for this collapse in
China’s exports.
First, it is found that GDP growth rates have signiﬁcantly negative effects on
reducing the risk of trade collapse. In other words, it is less likely for the exports to
the countries with high GDP growth rates to fall into collapse, or it takes longer pe-
riodoftimefortheexportstoshowthesignofcollapse. Thisresultclearlysupports
the demand-side explanation for this trade contraction. Comparing the coefﬁcients
of the GDP growth rates for 2008 and 2009 in magnitude, it is apparent that this
risk deduction effect is much stronger at the beginning of the economic downturn.
In 2008, the coefﬁcient of the GDP growth rate is 0.046 in magnitude, but it falls
to 0.0114 in 2009. This difference means that at the beginning of the recession, the
demand of importing countries plays a very important role in directing the trend
of China’s exports.
Second, in terms of SNA classiﬁcation, it is found that the coefﬁcients of capital
and intermediate goods are both signiﬁcantly negative, which implies that capi-
tal and intermediate goods are less likely to fall into collapse than consumption
goods. This result clearly supports the demand shock explanation and shows that
the hypothesis about ﬁnancial constraints on export supply-side do not seem to be
the working channel in this large export contraction.
Third, with regard to Rauch’s classiﬁcation, we ﬁnd it signiﬁcantly inﬂuences
the collapse speed. Differentiated goods are more likely to fall into collapse than
14homogeneous ones. This ﬁnding is consistent with the high elasticities of substitu-
tions associated with differentiated goods. Because this result is in line with both
the demand-side and supply-side explanations for this export contraction, this re-
sult cannot be used to differentiate the two driving forces.
Last and importantly, products with high shares of processing trade are found
having higher hazard rates to collapse, which means that they are more likely to
fall during the downturn. This result conﬁrms the demand-side explanation again
and shows that the supply-side explanation does not seem to be the working chan-
nel. However, it is worth mentioning that when foreign economies improve, the
industries with high shares of processing trade closely follow the recovery of for-
eign production and ﬁrst enjoy the strong recovering momentums. The strong
recovery momentum of high processing trade is apparent in Figure 3 shown in
section 2.
6 Robustness Tests
In order to test the robustness of our results, two groups of tests are implemented
in this section. One group focuses on estimating the model with different speciﬁ-
cations. The other group estimates the benchmark model with different criteria in
deﬁning the month when exports collapse.
In order to make sure the results are not driven by the assumptions of speciﬁc
econometric models. Different speciﬁcations are utilized to test the robustness of
the results. In the ﬁrst column of Table 3 where the basic proportional hazard
model is applied, standard errors within the same product categories may be pos-
itively correlated, and standard errors would be underestimated. In order to deal
with this concern, in column 2, we cluster the observations by the sections, a higher
aggregation of HS 2-digit codes.8 In the nomenclature of the Harmonized System,
all 6-digit codes are classiﬁed into 21 sections, such as “live animals; animal prod-
ucts”, “vegetable products”, “textile and textile products”, etc. The estimation
method used in column 2 is proposed by Lin and Wei (1989). Another way to
deal with the heterogeneity of each section is to use the shared frailty model. In
8Please refer to http://www.wcoomd.org for details of the classiﬁcation.
15this model, the latent random effect enters multiplicatively on the hazard function.
The hazard function takes the form h(t) = h0(t)gexp(Wc + Zp), where g refers
to the heterogeneity of sections. This model is actually a random effects model.
Its estimation results are shown in column 3 of Table 3. In column 4, we directly
includes sections as dummies. It is a ﬁxed effect model. It allows the latent section
effects to be correlated with the variables included in the model. In the last col-
umn of Table 3, we apply the stratiﬁed Cox model. This model allows each section
have its own baseline hazard function but the coefﬁcients across different sections
are constrained to be the same. Over these speciﬁcations, all our results remain
unchanged qualitatively.
So far, we have been using the criteria that the export values have to be lower
than the values of the same months in the previous year at least for 3 months in
a row. However, the requirement for 3 months is arbitrary. In order to test the
results are not driven by this criteria, we also use 4 and 2 months to redeﬁne the
month of export collapse and re-estimate the models in Table 3. The estimation
results are shown in Tables 4 and 5, respectively.9 Over these robustness tests,
our main results still hold. GDP growth rates prevent the exports from falling
into collapse. Capital and intermediate goods are less likely to show the sign of
continuous fall. Differentiated goods feel the occurrence of recession earlier than
more homogeneous goods. For the products with high shares of processing trade,
they show the sign of export collapse earlier than other goods.
7 Conclusions
This paper studies the speeds at which China’s exports collapse during the 2008—
2009 ﬁnancial crisis. The collapse speeds are quantiﬁed; the inﬂuential factors on
speed are tested.
9The numbers of observations decrease as we take shorter periods to deﬁne the exports of a
country-product falling into collapse. The reason is, more country-product combinations are found
falling into collapse at the same month when they are under observation as we use a shorter period
in deﬁning collapse. In survival analyses, these observations are automatically dropped.
16We ﬁnd that China’s exports are affected by the 2008—2009 ﬁnancial crisis most
broadly in May 2009. In May 2009, the largest number of country-product com-
binations shows the signs of collapse. In November 2008, the ratio of country-
product combinations who are labeled as falling into export collapse suddenly in-
creases by a large proportion and reaches the maximum in May 2009. After that,
this ratio gradually drops. In December 2009, this number drops substantially and
then come back to the level sustained prior to the economic crisis.
Demand and supply-side shocks give different predictions about key variables’
impacts on contraction speeds. By doing empirical analysis on China’s monthly
export data, our estimation results give good evidence for the demand-side expla-
nation of this collapse in China’s exports. We ﬁnd that exports are less likely to
collapse when the importing country has a strong GDP growth rate. This effect is
especially strong at the beginning of the crisis, i.e. in 2008. We also ﬁnd that cap-
ital and intermediate goods fall into collapse later than consumption goods. This
result is consistent with the fact that capital and intermediate goods are mainly
the inputs of ﬁnal consumption products and supports the demand shock expla-
nation. Meanwhile this ﬁnding also shows that the ﬁnancial constraints faced by
Chinese exporting ﬁrms do not seem to be the working channel in China during
the 2008–2009 trade collapse. Meanwhile, industries with high shares of process-
ing trade feel the occurrence of global recession earlier than other industries. This
result also clearly supports the demand-side explanation of this collapse in China’s
exports and rejects the conjecture about ﬁnancial constraints.
People and policy makers who need to forecast the short-run trend of China’s
exports should take a closer look at the industries with high shares of processing
trade or the processing trade in each industry. However, it is worth highlighting
that this forecast is sensible only when the changes in exports are mainly driven
by foreign demand shocks.
Two general lessons could be taken away from this exercise. First, survival
analyses provide another quantitative tool to study recent export collapse, other
than the standard analysis focusing on the magnitude of contraction. This tool is
especially useful when the change of magnitude and timing are not in line, i.e. the
industries whose exports drop by large shares may not be the ones who ﬁrst show
the signs of collapse. Second, timing is an important issue in studying the size of
changes. The conclusions drawing on the contraction size will be affected by the
17particular time periods and the length of periods chosen in calculating the changes
before and after the crisis.
18Table 3: Proportional Hazard Estimation Results for Recession Entry, 3 months
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Basic Cluster(section) RE FE Stratiﬁed
GDP 2008
c -0.0463a -0.0463a -0.0471a -0.0471a -0.0471a
(0.000881) (0.00374) (0.000880) (0.000880) (0.000880)
GDP 2009
c -0.0114a -0.0114a -0.0115a -0.0115a -0.0116a
(0.000541) (0.00286) (0.000540) (0.000540) (0.000540)
D
Capital
p -0.168a -0.168a -0.285a -0.285a -0.287a
(0.00813) (0.0615) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103)
DIntermediate
p -0.149a -0.149a -0.170a -0.170a -0.169a
(0.00641) (0.0557) (0.00727) (0.00727) (0.00727)
DDifferentiated
p 0.370a 0.370a 0.176a 0.175a 0.174a
(0.0306) (0.0717) (0.0316) (0.0316) (0.0316)
DReference
p 0.120a 0.120 0.0704b 0.0697b 0.0690b
(0.0316) (0.0857) (0.0323) (0.0323) (0.0323)
Ratio
Processing
p 0.209a 0.209c 0.140a 0.139a 0.140a
(0.00984) (0.116) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0107)
N 361877 361877 361877 361877 361877
Log-likelihood -1749073 -1749073 -1747857 -1747787.6 -1419380.3
Chi square 8267.41 1955.89 7439.05 10838.30 7515.03
Standard errors in parentheses c p < 0:1, b p < 0:05, a p < 0:01
19Table 4: Robustness Tests on Recession Entry, 4 months
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Basic Cluster(section) RE FE Stratiﬁed
GDP 2008
c -0.0579a -0.0579a -0.0587a -0.0587a -0.0587a
(0.00109) (0.00399) (0.00109) (0.00109) (0.00109)
GDP 2009
c -0.0151a -0.0151a -0.0152a -0.0152a -0.0153a
(0.000664) (0.00372) (0.000662) (0.000662) (0.000662)
D
Capital
p -0.193a -0.193a -0.320a -0.320a -0.321a
(0.00980) (0.0628) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0123)
DIntermediate
p -0.136a -0.136b -0.148a -0.148a -0.148a
(0.00763) (0.0581) (0.00864) (0.00864) (0.00864)
DDifferentiated
p 0.337a 0.337a 0.137a 0.135a 0.135a
(0.0361) (0.0714) (0.0373) (0.0373) (0.0373)
DReference
p 0.0825b 0.0825 0.0570 0.0560 0.0553
(0.0374) (0.0724) (0.0383) (0.0383) (0.0383)
Ratio
Processing
p 0.242a 0.242 0.182a 0.181a 0.182a
(0.0118) (0.150) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0128)
N 366853 366853 366853 366853 366853
Log-likelihood -1227394.7 -1227394.7 -1226384.4 -1226317.9 -997487.19
Chi square 8316.81 2310.02 7838.98 10470.52 7899.81
Standard errors in parentheses c p < 0:1, b p < 0:05, a p < 0:01
20Table 5: Robustness Tests on Recession Entry, 2 months
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Basic Cluster(section) RE FE Stratiﬁed
GDP 2008
c -0.0325a -0.0325a -0.0331a -0.0331a -0.0331a
(0.000731) (0.00364) (0.000730) (0.000730) (0.000730)
GDP 2009
c -0.00769a -0.00769a -0.00777a -0.00777a -0.00781a
(0.000453) (0.00181) (0.000452) (0.000452) (0.000452)
D
Capital
p -0.129a -0.129b -0.226a -0.226a -0.228a
(0.00704) (0.0502) (0.00900) (0.00900) (0.00901)
DIntermediate
p -0.131a -0.131a -0.157a -0.157a -0.157a
(0.00561) (0.0500) (0.00637) (0.00637) (0.00637)
DDifferentiated
p 0.369a 0.369a 0.203a 0.202a 0.201a
(0.0261) (0.0663) (0.0269) (0.0269) (0.0269)
DReference
p 0.164a 0.164c 0.0976a 0.0971a 0.0954a
(0.0269) (0.0885) (0.0275) (0.0275) (0.0275)
Ratio
Processing
p 0.175a 0.175b 0.111a 0.110a 0.112a
(0.00847) (0.0811) (0.00917) (0.00918) (0.00918)
N 344026 344026 344026 344026 344026
Log-likelihood -2316562.6 -2316562.6 -2315388 -2315318.7 -1874312.9
Chi square 6205.09 2367.78 5341.81 8692.87 5390.21
Standard errors in parentheses c p < 0:1, b p < 0:05, a p < 0:01
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